Detecting Malicious Content on Facebook by Dewan, Prateek & Kumaraguru, Ponnurangam
Detecting Malicious Content on Facebook
Prateek Dewan, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru
Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology - Delhi (IIITD), India
Cybersecurity Education and Research Centre (CERC)
{prateekd, pk}@iiitd.ac.in
Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs) witness a rise in user
activity whenever an event takes place. Malicious enti-
ties exploit this spur in user-engagement levels to spread
malicious content that compromises system reputation
and degrades user experience. It also generates revenue
from advertisements, clicks, etc. for the malicious enti-
ties. Facebook, the world’s biggest social network, is
no exception and has recently been reported to face
much abuse through scams and other type of malicious
content, especially during news making events. Recent
studies have reported that spammers earn $200 million
just by posting malicious links on Facebook. In this pa-
per, we characterize malicious content posted on Face-
book during 17 events, and discover that existing efforts
to counter malicious content by Facebook are not able
to stop all malicious content from entering the social
graph. Our findings revealed that malicious entities tend
to post content through web and third party applica-
tions while legitimate entities prefer mobile platforms
to post content. In addition, we discovered a substan-
tial amount of malicious content generated by Facebook
pages. Through our observations, we propose an exten-
sive feature set based on entity profile, textual content,
metadata, and URL features to identify malicious con-
tent on Facebook in real time and at zero-hour. This
feature set was used to train multiple machine learning
models and achieved an accuracy of 86.9%. The intent
is to catch malicious content that is currently evading
Facebook’s detection techniques. Our machine learning
model was able to detect more than double the num-
ber of malicious posts as compared to existing mali-
cious content detection techniques. Finally, we built a
real world solution in the form of a REST based API
and a browser plug-in to identify malicious Facebook
posts in real time.
Introduction
Social network activity rises considerably during events that
make the news, like sports, natural calamities, etc. (Szell,
Grauwin, and Ratti 2014). The FIFA World Cup in 2014,
for example, saw a record-breaking 350 million users gen-
erating over 3 billion posts on Facebook over a period of
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32 days. 1 Such colossal magnitude of activity makes OSNs
an attractive venue for malicious entities. Facebook, world’s
biggest social network, is no exception. Being the most pre-
ferred OSN for users to get news (Holcomb, Gottfried, and
Mitchell 2013), Facebook is potentially one of the most lu-
crative OSNs for malicious entities. Recently, a group of
malicious users exploited the famous biting incident during
the 2014 FIFA World Cup, where an Uruguayan player was
banned for biting an opponent. Attackers used the viral na-
ture of this incident to spread links on Facebook, pointing
to a phishing page prompting visitors to sign a petition in
defense of the Uruguayan player. 2 The petition required a
user to sign in with details such as name, country of res-
idence, mobile phone number and email address. The peti-
tioner could potentially end up on a spam mailing list, on the
receiving end of a malicious attachment or even subjected to
a targeted attack. In another recent incident of Malaysian
Airline MH17 flight crash, scammers placed dozens of so-
called ‘community pages’ on Facebook, dedicated to victims
of the tragedy. On the page, Facebook users were tricked
into clicking links showing extra or unseen footage of the
crash. Instead of seeing a video, they were led to various
pop-up ads for porn sites or online casinos. 3 Such activity
not only violates Facebook’s terms of service, but also de-
grades user experience. It has been claimed that Facebook
spammers make $200 million just by posting links. 4 Face-
book has confirmed spam as a serious issue, and taken steps
to reduce spam and malicious content in users’ newsfeed re-
cently (Owens and Turitzin 2014).
The problem of identifying malicious content is not spe-
cific to Facebook and has been widely studied on other
OSNs in the past. Researchers have used feature based ma-
chine learning models to detect spam and other types of ma-
licious content on OSNs like Twitter, and achieved good
results (Benevenuto et al. 2010; Grier et al. 2010). How-
ever, existing approaches to detect malicious content in other
1http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/14/tech/social-media/world-
cup-social-media/
2http://www.emirates247.com/news/fifa-world-cup-2014-
smitten-by-suarez-bitten-by-spammers-2014-07-12-1.556216
3http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/07/22/flight-17-spam-scams-
facebook-twitter/
4http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/28/
facebook-spam-202-million-italian-research
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OSNs like Twitter, cannot be directly ported to Facebook
because they heavily rely on features that aren’t publicly
available from Facebook. These include profile, and network
information, age of the account, total number of messages
posted, number of social connections, etc.
In this paper, we highlight that existing techniques used
by Facebook for countering malicious content do not elim-
inate all malicious posts completely. Although Facebook’s
immune system (Stein, Chen, and Mangla 2011) seems to
perform well at protecting its users from malicious con-
tent, our focus is on detecting the fraction of content which
evades this system. We identify some key characteristics of
malicious content spread on Facebook, which distinguishes
it from legitimate content. Our dataset consists of 4.4 million
public posts generated by 3.3 million unique entities during
17 events, across a 16 month time frame (April 2013 - July
2014). We then propose an extensive set of 42 features which
can be used to distinguish malicious content from legitimate
content in real time and at zero-hour. We emphasize on zero-
hour detection because content on OSNs spreads like wild-
fire, and can reach thousands of users within seconds. Such
velocity and reach of OSN content makes it hard to con-
trol the spread of malicious content, if not detected instantly.
We apply machine learning techniques to identify malicious
posts on Facebook using this feature set and achieve a maxi-
mum accuracy of 86.9% using the Random Forest classifier.
We also compare our technique with past research and find
that our machine learning model is able to detect more than
twice the number of malicious posts as compared to cluster-
ing based campaign detection techniques used in the past.
Related work
Facebook has its own immune system (Stein, Chen, and
Mangla 2011) to safeguard its users from unwanted mali-
cious content. Researchers at Facebook built and deployed
a coherent, scalable, and extensible real time system to pro-
tect their users and the social graph. This system performs
real time checks and classifications on every read and write
action. Designers of this complex system used an exhaus-
tive set of components and techniques to differentiate be-
tween legitimate actions and spam. These components were
standard classifiers like Random Forest, Support Vector Ma-
chines, Logistic Regression, a feature extraction language,
dynamic model loading, a policy engine, and feature loops.
Interestingly, despite this complex immune system deployed
by Facebook, unwanted spam, phishing, and other malicious
content continues to exist and thrive on Facebook. Although
the immune system deployed by Facebook utilizes a variety
of techniques to safeguard its users, authors did not present
an evaluation of the system to suggest how accurately and
efficiently the system is able to capture malicious content.
Detection of malicious content on Facebook Gao et al.,
in 2010, presented an initial study to quantify and charac-
terize spam campaigns launched using accounts on Face-
book (Gao et al. 2010). They studied a large anonymized
dataset of 187 million asynchronous “wall” messages be-
tween Facebook users, and used a set of automated tech-
niques to detect and characterize coordinated spam cam-
paigns. Authors detected roughly 200,000 malicious wall
posts with embedded URLs, originating from more than
57,000 user accounts. Following up their work, Gao et al.
presented an online spam filtering system that could be de-
ployed as a component of the OSN platform to inspect mes-
sages generated by users in real-time (Gao et al. 2012).
Their approach focused on reconstructing spam messages
into campaigns for classification rather than examining each
post individually. They were able to achieve a true positive
rate of slightly over 80% using this technique, and achieved
an average throughput of 1,580 messages/sec with an aver-
age processing latency of 21.5ms on their Facebook dataset
of 187 million wall posts. However, the clustering approach
used by authors always marked a new cluster as non mali-
cious, and was unable to detect malicious posts if the sys-
tem had not seen a similar post before. We overcome this
drawback in our work by eliminating dependence on post
similarity, and using classification instead of clustering.
In an attempt to protect Facebook users from malicious
posts, Rahman et al. designed an efficient social malware de-
tection method which took advantage of the social context of
posts (Rahman et al. 2012). Authors were able to achieve a
maximum true positive accuracy rate of 97%, using a SVM
based classifier trained on 6 features, and requiring 46 mil-
liseconds to classify a post. This model was then used to
develop MyPageKeeper 5, a Facebook app to protect users
from malware and malicious posts. Similar to Gao et al’s
work (Gao et al. 2010), this work was also targeted at de-
tecting spam campaigns, and relied on message similarity
features.
Detection of malicious content on other OSNs Multiple
machine learning based techniques have been proposed in
the past to detect malicious content on other social networks
such as Twitter and YouTube (Benevenuto et al. 2010;
Grier et al. 2010; Wang 2010; McCord and Chuah 2011).
The efficiency of such techniques comes from features like
age of the account, number of social connections, past mes-
sages of the user, etc. (Benevenuto et al. 2010). However,
none of these features are available on Facebook publicly.
Other techniques make use of OSN specific features like
user replies, user mentions, retweets (Twitter) (Grier et
al. 2010), post views and ratings (YouTube) (Benevenuto
et al. 2009) to identify malicious content, which cannot
be ported to Facebook. Blacklists have been shown to be
highly ineffective initially, capturing less than 20% URLs at
zero-hour (Sheng et al. 2009). None of these techniques can
thus be used for efficient zero-hour detection of malicious
content on Facebook. To the best of our knowledge, our
technique is one of the first attempts towards zero-hour
detection of malicious content on Facebook.
Most aforementioned techniques to identify malicious
content on Facebook largely rely on message similarity fea-
tures. Such techniques are reasonably efficient in detecting
content which they have seen in the past, for example, cam-
5https://apps.facebook.com/mypagekeeper/
paigns. However, none of the these techniques are capable
of detecting malicious posts which their systems haven’t
seen in the past. Researchers have acknowledged this draw-
back (Gao et al. 2010) and zero-hour detection of malicious
content on Facebook remains an unaddressed problem.
Methodology
There exists a wide range of malicious content on OSNs to-
day. These include phishing URLs, spreading malware, ad-
vertising campaigns, content originating from compromised
profiles, artificial reputation gained through fake likes, etc.
We do not intend to address all such attacks. We focus our
analysis on identifying posts containing one or more mali-
cious URLs and creating automated means to detect such
posts in real time, without looking at the landing pages of
the URLs. We emphasize on not visiting the landing pages
of URLs since this process induces time lag and increases
the time taken by real time systems to make a judgment on a
post. Existing methods involve detection of such malicious
posts by grouping them into campaigns (Gao et al. 2010),
or by looking up public blacklists like PhishTank, Google
Safebrowsing, etc. to identify malicious URLs. However, as
previously discussed, both campaign detection techniques
and URL blacklists prove ineffective while the attack is new.
For the scope of this work, we refer to a post as malicious if
it contains one or more malicious URLs.
Data collection
We collected data using Facebook’s Graph API Search end-
point (Facebook Developers 2013) during 17 events that
took place between April 2013 and July 2014. The search
endpoint in version 1.0 of the Graph API allows search-
ing over many public objects in the social graph, like users,
posts, events, pages etc., using a search query keyword. We
used event specific terms for each of the 17 events (see Ta-
ble 1) to collect relevant public posts. Unlike other social
networks like Twitter, Facebook does not provide an API
endpoint to collect a continuous random sample of public
posts in real time. Thus, we used the search API to collect
data. A drawback of the search method is that if a post is
deleted or removed (either by the user herself, or by Face-
book) before our data collection module queries the API,
it would not appear in the search results. We repeated the
search every 15 minutes to overcome this drawback to some
extent. In all, we collected over 4.4 million public Facebook
posts generated by over 3.3 million unique entities. Table 2
shows the descriptive statistics of our final dataset.
Event selection All events we picked for our analysis,
made headlines in international news. To maintain diversity,
we selected events covering various domains of news events
like political, sport, natural hazards, terror strikes and en-
tertainment news. We tried to pick a mixture of crisis, and
non crisis events which took place in, and affected different
parts of the world. In terms of data, we selected events with
at least 1,000 public Facebook posts. For all 17 events, we
started data collection from the time the event took place,
and stopped about two weeks after the event ended.
Labeled dataset creation
To create a labeled dataset, we first filtered out all posts con-
taining at least one URL. We used regular expressions to
filter out all possible URLs from the message field of the
posts. These URLs were added to the set of URLs present
in the link field (if available) for each post. These extracted
URLs were then visited using Python’s Requests package 6
and LongURL API 7, in case the Requests package failed.
Visiting the landing pages of the URLs before the black-
list lookup helped us to eliminate invalid URLs and capture
the correct final destination URLs corresponding to short-
ened URLs, if any. After the extraction and validation pro-
cess, we were left with a total of 480,407 unique URLs
across 1,222,137 unique posts (Table 2). Each URL was then
subjected to five blacklist lookups, viz. SURBL (SURBL,
URI 2011), Google Safebrowsing (Google 2014), Phish-
Tank (OpenDNS 2014), VirusTotal (Hispasec Sistemas S.L.
2013), and Web of Trust (WOT 2014). This methodology of
identifying malicious content using URL blacklists has also
been used multiple times in past research (Gao et al. 2010;
Chu, Widjaja, and Wang 2012; Thomas et al. 2011).
Unique posts 4,465,371
Unique entities 3,373,953
- Unique users 2,983,707
- Unique pages 390,246
Unique URLs 480,407
Unique posts with URLs 1,222,137
Unique entities posting URLs 856,758
Unique posts with malicious URLs 11,217
Unique entities posting malicious URLs 7,962
Unique malicious URLs 4,622
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of complete dataset collected
over April 2013 - August 2014.
The scan results returned by the VirusTotal API contain
domain information from multiple services like TrendMi-
cro, BitDefender, WebSense ThreatSeeker, etc. for a given
domain. We marked a URL as malicious if one or more of
these services categorized the domain of the URL as spam,
malicious, or phishing. The Web of Trust (WOT) API re-
turns a reputation score for a given domain. Reputations are
measured for domains in several components, for example,
trustworthiness. For each {domain, component} pair,
the system computes two values: a reputation estimate and
the confidence in the reputation. Together, these indicate the
amount of trust in the domain in the given component. A rep-
utation estimate of below 60 indicates unsatisfactory. Also,
the WOT browser add-on requires a confidence value of ≥
10 before it presents a warning about a website. We tested
the domain of each URL in our dataset for two components,
viz. Trustworthiness and Child Safety. For our experiment,
a URL was marked as malicious if both the aforementioned
conditions were satisfied. That is, if the reputation estimate
for a domain of a URL was below 60 (unsatisfactory, poor
or very poor) and the confidence in the reputation was ≥ 10,
the URL was marked malicious. In addition to reputations,
6http://docs.python-requests.org/en/latest/
7http://longurl.org/api
Event (keywords) # Posts Description
Missing Air Algerie Flight AH5017 (ah5017;
air algerie)
6,767 Air Algerie flight 5017 disappeared from radar 50 minutes after take
off on July 24, 2014. Found crashed near Mali; no survivors.
Boston Marathon Blasts (prayforboston;
marathon blasts; boston marathon)
1,480,467 Two pressure cooker bombs exploded during the Boston Marathon at
2:49 pm EDT, April 15, 2013, killing 3 and injuring 264.
Cyclone Phailin (phailin;
cyclonephailin)
60,016 Phailin was the second-strongest tropical cyclone ever to make land-
fall in India on October 11, 2013.
FIFA World Cup 2014 (worldcup;
fifaworldcup)
67,406 20th edition of FIFA world cup, began on June 12, 2014. Germany
beat Argentina in the final to win the tournament.
Unrest in Gaza (gaza) 31,302 Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in the Hamas-ruled Gaza
Strip on July 8, 2014.
Heartbleed bug in OpenSSL (heartbleed) 8,362 Security bug in OpenSSL disclosed on April 1, 2014. About 17% of
the world’s web servers found to be at risk.
IPL 2013 (ipl; ipl6; ipl2013) 708,483 Edition 6 of IPL cricket tournament hosted in India, April-May 2013.
IPL 2014 (ipl; ipl7) 59,126 Edition 7 of IPL cricket tournament jointly hosted by United Arab
Emirates and India, April-May 2013.
Lee Rigby’s murder in Woolwich (woolwich;
londonattack)
86,083 British soldier Lee Rigby attacked and murdered by Michael Adebo-
lajo and Michael Adebowale in Woolwich, London on May 22, 2013.
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 shot down
(mh17)
27,624 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crashed on 17 July 2014, presumed to
have been shot down, killing all 298 on board.
Metro-North Train Derailment (bronx
derailment; metro north
derailment; metronorth)
1,165 A Metro-North Railroad Hudson Line passenger train derailed near
the Spuyten Duyvil station in the New York City borough of the Bronx
on December 1, 2013. Four killed, 59 injured.
Washington Navy Yard Shootings (washington
navy yard; navy yard shooting;
NavyYardShooting)
4,562 Lone gunman Aaron Alexis killed 12 and injured 3 in a mass shooting
at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) headquarters inside
the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 16, 2013.
Death of Nelson Mandela (nelson; mandela;
nelsonmandela; madiba)
1,319,783 Nelson Mandela, the first elected President of South Africa, died on
December 5, 2013. He was 95.
Birth of the fist Royal Baby (RoyalBabyWatch;
kate middleton; royalbaby)
90,096 Prince George of Cambridge, first son of Prince William, and Cather-
ine (Kate Middleton), was born on July 22, 2013.
Typhoon Haiyan (haiyan; yolanda;
typhoon philippines)
486,325 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever
recorded, devastated parts of Southeast Asia on Nov. 8, 2013.
T20 Cricket World Cup (wt20; wt2014) 25,209 Fifth ICC World Twenty20 cricket competition, hosted in Bangladesh
during March-April, 2014. Sri Lanka won the tournament.
Wimbledon Tennis 2014 (wimbledon) 2,633 128th Wimbledon Tennis championship held between June 23, and
July 6, 2014. Novak Djokovic from Serbia won the championship.
Table 1: Event name, keywords used as search queries, number of posts, and description for each of the 17 events in our dataset.
the WOT rating system also computes categories for web-
sites based on votes from users and third parties. We marked
a URL as malicious if it fell under the Negative or Ques-
tionable category group. 8 Further, a URL was marked ma-
licious if it was present under any category (spam / malware
/ phishing) in the SURBL, Google Safebrowsing or Phish-
Tank blacklists.
The reason for including WOT reputation scores in our la-
beled dataset of malicious posts was two-fold. Firstly, as pre-
viously discussed, one of the goals of this work is to evalu-
ate Facebook’s current techniques to counter malicious con-
tent. Facebook partnered with WOT (Facebook Developers
2011) to protect its users from malicious URLs (discussed
further in Analysis and results section). Evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of Facebook’s use of WOT was one of the ways
to achieve our goal. Secondly, when it comes to real world
events, malicious entities tend to engage in spreading fake,
untrustworthy and obscene content to degrade user experi-
ence (Gupta et al. 2013; Gupta, Lamba, and Kumaraguru
2013). This kind of information, despite being malicious,
8The exact category labels corresponding to Negative and Ques-
tionable categories can be found at https://www.mywot.com/wiki/
API
is not captured by blacklists like Google Safebrowsing and
SURBL, since they do not fall under the more obvious kinds
of threats like malware and phishing. WOT scores helped us
to identify and tag such content.
Analysis and results
We now present our findings about the effectiveness of Face-
book’s current techniques of malicious content detection and
the differences between malicious and legitimate content on
Facebook. We then use these difference to identify a set of
42 features and apply standard machine learning techniques
to automatically differentiate malicious content from legiti-
mate content.
Efficiency of Facebook’s current techniques
Facebook’s immune system uses multiple URL blacklists
to detect malicious URLs in real time and prevent them
from entering the social graph (Stein, Chen, and Mangla
2011). Understandably, the inefficiency of blacklists to de-
tect URLs at zero-hour makes this technique considerably
ineffective (Sheng et al. 2009). We tried to check if Face-
book was taking any measures to overcome this drawback.
To this end, we re-queried the Graph API for all malicious
posts in our dataset and observed if Facebook was able to
detect and remove malicious posts at a later point in time.
We also studied the effectiveness of Facebook’s partnership
with WOT to protect its users from malicious URLs (Face-
book Developers 2011).
Upon re-querying the Graph API in November 2014, we
found that only 3,921 out of the 11,217 (34.95%) malicious
posts had been deleted. It was surprising to note that almost
two thirds of all malicious posts (65.05%) which got past
Facebook’s real time detection filters remained undetected
even after at least 4 months (between July 2014, when we
stopped data collection, and November 2014, when we re-
queried the API) from the date of post. Collectively, these
posts had gathered likes from 52,169 unique users and com-
ments from 8,784 unique users at the time we recollected
their data in November 2014. Figure 1 shows one such mali-
cious post from our dataset which went undetected by Face-
book. The short URL in the post points to a scam website
which misleads users into earning money by liking posts on
Facebook. Using the URL endpoint of the Graph API 9, we
also found that the 4,622 unique URLs present in the 11,217
malicious posts had been shared on Facebook over 37 mil-
lion times. A possible reason for the continued existence of
malicious posts could be that Facebook does not rescan a
post once it passes through Facebook’s content filter and into
the social network.
Figure 1: One of the 7,296 malicious posts from our dataset
which were not deleted by Facebook. We revisited this post
after 11 months of being posted.
For the 3,921 posts that were deleted, an interesting as-
pect to study was the amount of time it took for these posts
to get removed. Although we were not able capture this in-
formation, we used the minimum retention period (time dif-
ference between the time of post creation and the time of
post capture in our dataset) to estimate a lower bound on
this value. We observed that the median time difference be-
tween a post’s creation time and capture time was 4.64 hours
(µ = 41.99 hours, σ = 128.7 hours, min. = 1 second, max =
54 days). Figure 2 represents the minimum retention period
of the 3,921 malicious posts in our dataset, which were not
deleted by Facebook until November, 2014.
To get an accurate approximation of the time it took for a
malicious post to get deleted, the ideal approach would have
been to re-query the Graph API for each post we collected,
9https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/v2.
2/url
Figure 2: Minimum retention period (in hours) of malicious
posts in our dataset which were removed from Facebook.
Approximately 51% of the 3,921 posts were captured within
the first 5 hours of being posted.
repeatedly after a fixed (small) interval of time. However, re-
querying the API for all 4.4 million posts in our dataset re-
peatedly and periodically was a computationally expensive
and infeasible task.
The above analysis suggests malicious content which
goes undetected by Facebook’s real time filters not only re-
mains undetected for at least some time, but thrives on users’
likes and comments. This increases the reach and visibility of
malicious content and potentially exposes a much larger sec-
tion of users than the attacker may have initially intended. A
real time zero-hour detection technique can aid the identifi-
cation and removal of such content, and can further improve
Facebook’s existing systems for malicious content detection.
Partnership with Web of Trust Facebook partnered with
Web of Trust in 2011 to protect its users from malicious
URLs (Facebook Developers 2011). According to this part-
nership, Facebook shows a warning page to the user when-
ever she clicks on a link which has been reported for spam,
malware, phishing or any other kind of abuse on WOT (Fig-
ure 3). To verify the existence of this warning page, we
manually visited a random sample of 100 posts containing
a URL marked as malicious by WOT, and clicked on the
URL. Surprisingly, the warning page did not appear even
once. We also noticed that over 88% of all malicious URLs
in our dataset (4,077 out of 4,622) were marked as mali-
cious by Web of Trust. This highlights considerable ineffi-
cacy in Facebook’s partnership with Web of Trust to control
the spread of malicious URLs.
From the above analysis, it is evident that Facebook’s ex-
isting techniques to combat the spread of malicious content
through the social graph still have scope for improvement. In
the next section, we highlight some key characteristics of the
malicious content we found in our dataset. We present some
important features which can be used to subdue the short-
comings of blacklist lookups and help Facebook in identify-
Figure 3: Warning page shown by Facebook whenever a user
clicks on a link reported as abusive on Web of Trust. The
user may chose to return or ignore the warning and visit the
URL any way.
ing malicious content from legitimate content efficiently and
in real time.
Key characteristics of malicious content
We analyzed the malicious content in our dataset in three as-
pects; a) textual content and URLs, b) entities who post ma-
licious content, and c) metadata associated with malicious
content. We now look at all these three aspects individually
in detail.
Textual content and URLs From our dataset of 11,217
unique malicious posts, we first looked at the most com-
monly appearing posts. Similar to past work (Gao et al.
2010), we found various campaigns promoting a particular
entity or event. However, campaigns in our dataset were very
different than those discussed in the past. Table 3 shows the
top 10 campaigns we found in our dataset of malicious posts.
We found that most of the campaigns in our dataset were
event specific, and targeted at celebrities and famous per-
sonalities who were part of the event. Although this seems
fairly obvious because of our event based dataset, such cam-
paigns reflect the attackers’ preferences of using the context
of an event to target OSN users. Attackers now prefer to ex-
ploit users’ curiosity, instead of hijacking trends and post-
ing unrelated content (like promoting free iPhone, illegal
drugs, cheap pills, free ringtones, etc.) using topic specific
keywords.
We then looked at the various types of malicious posts
present in our dataset. We found that the most common
type of malicious posts were the ones with URLs point-
ing to adult content and incidental nudity, and marked un-
safe for children (52.0%) by Web of Trust. The second
most common types of malicious posts comprised of neg-
ative (malware, phishing, scam, etc.) and questionable (mis-
leading claims or unethical, spam, hate, discrimination, po-
tentially unwanted programs, etc.) category URLs (45.2%),
closely followed by posts containing untrustworthy sources
of information (38.22%). Interestingly, only 325 malicious
posts (2.9%) advertised a phishing URL. This is a drastic
drop as compared to the observations made by Gao et al. in
2010, where they found that over 70% of all malicious posts
in their dataset advertised phishing (Gao et al. 2010). We
also found that 18.4% of the malicious posts in our dataset
Post Summary Count
Sexy Football Worldcup - Bodypainting 155
10 Things Nelson Mandela Said That Everyone Should
Know
154
Was Bishop Desmond Tutu Frozen Out of Nelson
Mandela’s Funeral?
105
Nude images of Kate Middleton 73
The Gospel Profoundly Affected Nelson Mandela’s
Life After Prison
72
Promotion of Obamacare (Affordable Care Act)
through Nelson Mandela’s death
67
Radical post about Nelson Mandela 54
Was Nelson Mandela a Christian? 41
R.I.P. Nelson Mandela: How he changed the world 36
Easy free cash 29
Table 3: Top 10 most common posts in our dataset of mali-
cious posts.
(2,064 posts out of 11,217) advertised one or more shortened
URLs. Past literature has shown wide usage of shortened
URLs to spread malicious content on microblogging plat-
forms (Chhabra et al. 2011; Antoniades et al. 2011). Short
URLs have seen a significant increase in their usage mostly
due to restriction of message length on OSNs like Twitter.
However, given that this restriction on message length does
not apply on Facebook, obfuscation of actual landing pages
is, most likely, the primary reason behind usage of shortened
URLs.
In addition to post categories, we also looked at the most
common URL domains in our dataset. Table 4 shows the
10 most widely shared malicious and legitimate domains
in our dataset. It is interesting to note that Facebook and
YouTube constituted almost 60% of all legitimate URLs
shared during the 17 events. The remaining legitimate URLs
largely belonged to news websites. On the contrary, mali-
cious URLs were more evenly distributed across a mixture
of categories including news, sports, entertainment, blogs,
etc. Our dataset revealed that a large fraction of malicious
content comprised of untrustworthy sources of information,
which may have inappropriate implications in the real world,
especially during events like elections, riots, etc. Most pre-
vious studies on detecting malicious content on online social
networks have concentrated on identifying more obvious
threats like malware and phishing (Benevenuto et al. 2010;
Grier et al. 2010; Wang 2010). There exists some work on
studying trustworthiness of information on other social net-
works like Twitter (Castillo, Mendoza, and Poblete 2011;
Gupta and Kumaraguru 2012). However, to the best of our
knowledge, no past work addresses the problem of identify-
ing untrustworthy content on Facebook.
Entities posting malicious content Having found a rea-
sonable number of malicious posts in our dataset, we fur-
ther investigated the entities (users / pages) who generated
these malicious posts. We found that over 25% of the entire
3.3 million unique entities in our dataset (approx. 0.85 mil-
lion) posted at least one URL, and 0.24% (7,962) unique
entities posted at least one malicious URL (see Table 2).
Content on Facebook is generated by two types of entities;
users and pages. Pages are public profiles specifically cre-
Malicious Domain WOT categories VirusTotal Category % Legitimate Domain VirusTotal Cate-
gory
%
bizpacreview.com Untrustworthy News 5.60 facebook.com Social networks 53.17
9cric.com Child unsafe Sports 4.69 youtube.com Social web 6.69
imgur.com Child unsafe Online Photos 3.45 cnn.com News 0.72
allchristiannews.com Untrustworthy, Child un-
safe, hate, discrimination
News, Traditional reli-
gions
2.53 bbc.co.uk News 0.58
worldstarhiphop.com Child unsafe, adult content,
gruesome or shocking
Entertainment, Stream-
ing media
2.42 twitter.com Social networks 0.50
mobilelikez.com Untrustworthy, Child un-
safe, spam
Society and lifestyle 2.21 theguardian.com News 0.49
liveleak.com Child unsafe, adult content,
gruesome or shocking
News, Violence,
Streaming media
2.01 za.news.yahoo.com Search engine 0.47
25.media.tumblr.com Child unsafe, adult content Blogs and personal
sites, adult content
1.44 dailymail.co.uk News, entertain-
ment
0.39
sensuelweb.com Adult content Adult content 1.27 apps.facebook.com Social networks 0.37
exopolitics.blogs.com Child unsafe, adult content Blogs / social networks 1.21 huffingtonpost.com News 0.31
Table 4: Top 10 malicious and legitimate domains and their VirusTotal categories (and Web of Trust categories for malicious
domains) in our dataset. Most legitimate URLs shared on Facebook belonged to their own domain. Malicious domains were
much more evenly spread.
ated for businesses, brands, celebrities, causes, and other or-
ganizations, often for publicity. Unlike users, pages do not
gain “friends,” but “fans,” people who choose to “like” a
page. In our dataset, we identified pages by the presence
of category field in the response returned by Graph API
search (Facebook Developers 2013) during the initial data
collection process. The category field is specific to pages
and we manually verified that it was returned for all pages
in our dataset. All remaining entities were users. We queried
the Graph API 10 for profiles of all the 3.3 million entities
in our dataset in October 2014. During this process, gender
information for all users was acquired and changes in page
category (if any) were captured. We found that 10.2% of
the pages (39,843) had been deleted, and 8.7% of the pages
(33,794) had changed their category.
Upon analyzing users, we found that for users who
posted malicious URLs, the gender distribution was skewed
towards the male population as compared to the gender
distribution for legitimate users in our dataset (see Fig-
ure 4). For malicious users, the male:female ratio was
1:2.41 (Figure 4(a)), whereas for legitimate users posting
one or more URLs, this ratio was 1:2 (Figure 4(b)). The
male:female distribution further dropped to 1:1.62 for
all legitimate users (Figure 7(b)). We also found that pages
were more active in posting malicious URLs as compared to
non malicious URLs. Pages were observed to constitute 21%
(1,676 out of 7,962) of all malicious entities (Figure 4(a)),
while only 10% of all legitimate URL posting entities were
pages (Figure 4(b)). A similar percentage of pages (12%)
was found to constitute all legitimate entities in our dataset
(Figure 7(b)). We also found 43 verified pages and 1 verified
user among entities who posted malicious content. The most
common type of verified pages were radio station pages
(12), website pages (5) and public figure pages (4). Com-
bined together, the 43 verified pages had over 71 million
likes.
It is important to note that most of the past attempts
10https://graph.facebook.com/〈entity id〉
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Figure 4: Gender and category distribution of (a) Mali-
cious entities (N=7,962); (b) Non malicious entities post-
ing URLs (N=849,190); and (c) All non malicious entities
(N=3,365,991) in our dataset.
at studying malicious content on Facebook did not cap-
ture content posted by pages, and concentrated only on
users (Ahmed and Abulaish 2012; Gao et al. 2010; Stringh-
ini, Kruegel, and Vigna 2010). Malicious content originat-
ing from pages in our dataset brings out a new element
of Facebook, which is yet to be addressed. Facebook lim-
its the number of friends a user can have, but there is not
limit on the number of people who can subscribe to (Like,
in terms of Facebook terminology) a page. Content posted
by a page can thus, have much larger audience than that of a
user, making malicious content posted by pages potentially
more widespread and dangerous than that posted by indi-
vidual users. We found that in our dataset, pages posting
malicious content had 123,255 Likes on average (min. = 0,
max. = 50,034,993), whereas for legitimate pages, the aver-
age number of Likes per page was only 45,812 (min. = 0,
max. = 502,938,006). Upon further investigation, we found
high similarity between the categories of the most famous
pages posting legitimate and malicious content. We found
that the 10 most famous categories of pages posting mali-
cious content were also among the most famous categories
of pages posting legitimate content (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Top ten page categories among Facebook pages
posting malicious content. We found similar category distri-
bution among malicious and non-malicious pages.
Metadata There are various types of metadata associated
with a post, for example, application used to post, time of
post, type of post (picture / video / link), location etc. Meta-
data is a rich source of information that can be used to dif-
ferentiate between malicious and legitimate users. Figure 6
shows the distribution of the top 25 applications (web / mo-
bile / other) used to post content in our dataset. 11 We ob-
served that over 51% of all legitimate content was posted
through mobile apps. This percentage dropped to below 15%
for malicious content. Third party and custom applications
(captured in “Other” in Figure 6) were used to generate
11.5% of all malicious content in our dataset as compared
to only 1.4% of all legitimate content being generated by
such applications. This behavior reflects that malicious en-
tities make use of web and third party applications (possi-
bly for automation) to spread malicious content, and can be
an indicator of malicious activity. Legitimate entities, on the
other hand, largely resort to standard mobile platforms to
post.
Although Facebook has more web users than mobile
users (Facebook 2014), our observations may be biased to-
wards mobile users due to our event specific dataset. As
described in the Data section, our data was collected dur-
ing 17 real world events. Past literature has shown high so-
cial network activity through mobile devices during such
events (Gupta, Lamba, and Kumaraguru 2013).
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Figure 6: Sources of malicious content, legitimate content
with URLs, and all legitimate content. Mobile platforms
were preferred over web for posting legitimate content.
11The top 25 applications were used to generate over 95% of
content in all three categories we analysed.
We also observed significant difference in the content
types that constituted malicious and legitimate content. Over
50% of legitimate posts containing a URL were photos or
videos whereas this percentage dropped to below 6% for
malicious content. A large proportion of these photos and
videos were uploaded on Facebook itself. This was one of
the main reasons for facebook.com being the most com-
mon legitimate domain in our dataset (see Table 4). We
used these, and some other features to train multiple ma-
chine learning algorithms for automatic detection of mali-
cious content. The results of our experiments are presented
in the next section.
Detecting malicious content automatically
Past efforts for automatic detection of spam and mali-
cious content on Facebook largely focus on detecting cam-
paigns (Gao et al. 2012; Gao et al. 2010), and rely heav-
ily on message similarity features to detect malicious con-
tent (Rahman et al. 2012). Researchers using this approach
have reported consistent accuracies of over 80% using small
feature sets comprising of under 10 features. However, this
approach is ineffective in zero-hour detection since the
aforementioned models require to have seen similar spam
messages in the past. To overcome this inability, we propose
an extensive set of 42 features (see Table 5) to detect ma-
licious content, excluding features like message similarity,
likes, comments, shares etc., which are absent at zero-hour.
We group these 42 features into four categories based on the
their source; Entity (E), Text content (T), Metadata (M) and
Link (L).
Source Features
Entity
(9)
is a page / user, gender, page category, has user-
name, username length, name length, num. words
in name, locale, likes on page
Text con-
tent (18)
Presence of !, ?, !!, ??, emoticons (smile, frown),
num. words, avg. word length, num. sentences,
avg. sentence length, num. English dictionary
words, num. hashtags, hashtags per word, num.
characters, num. URLs, num. URLs per word,
num. uppercase characters, num. words / num.
unique words
Metadata
(8)
App, has FB.com URL, has message, has story, has
link, has picture, type, link length
Link (7) has HTTP / HTTPS, hyphen count, paramters
count, parameter length, num. subdomains, path
length
Table 5: Features used for machine learning experiments.
We extracted features from four sources, viz. entity, content,
metadata, and link.
We trained four classifiers using 11,217 unique malicious
posts as the positive class and 11,217 unique legitimate
posts, randomly drawn from the 1,210,920 unique legiti-
mate posts containing one or more URLs (see Table 2) as
the negative class. All experiments were performed using
Weka (Hall et al. 2009). A 10-fold cross validation on this
training set yielded a maximum accuracy of 86.9% using the
Random Forest classifier. Table 6 describes the results in de-
tail. We also performed the classification experiments using
the four category features (E, T, M, and L) separately, and
observed that link (L) features performed the best, yield-
ing an accuracy of 82.3%. A combination of all four cat-
egory features, however, outperformed the individual cat-
egory scores, signifying that none of the category features
individually could identify malicious posts as accurately as
their combination. We also recorded the accuracy results for
the Random Forest classifier by varying the number of fea-
tures according to their information gain values (see Fig-
ure 7(a)). We calculated the accuracy for 1 through all 42
features, adding features one by one in decreasing order of
their information gain value, and found that the accuracy
peaked at the top 10 features. All four classifiers achieved
higher accuracy when trained on the top 10 features, as com-
pared to accuracy when trained on all 42 features (see Ta-
ble 6). Table 7 shows the information gain value and source
of the top 10 features.
Feature Set E T M L All Top10
Naive Bayesian 58.9 52.0 75.0 66.3 58.8 74.3
Decision Tree 63.8 65.4 80.8 82.0 85.0 85.8
Random Forest 63.6 65.6 80.9 82.3 85.5 86.9
AdaBoost 59.5 62.8 76.5 71.8 76.8 77.4
Table 6: Ten-fold cross validation accuracies for four classi-
fiers over six different feature sets.
Feature Source Info. Gain
Presence of Facebook.com URL Metadata 0.240
Post type Metadata 0.219
Length of parameter(s) in URL Link 0.216
Application used to post Metadata 0.209
Length of link field Metadata 0.201
Number of parameters in URL Link 0.178
Number of sub-domains in URL Link 0.110
Length of URL path (after domain) Link 0.093
Number of hyphens in URL Link 0.084
Presence of story field Metadata 0.071
Table 7: Source and information gain value of the top 10
features.
We performed further experiments to observe the change
in true positive rate, false positive rate and accuracy values
with change in training dataset sizes. The Random Forest
classifier was used for these experiments since it gave the
highest accuracy amongst the four classifiers we used in the
previous experiment. We used all 42 features to train the
classifier in this experiment. Keeping the size of the posi-
tive class constant (11,217 instances), the size of the train-
ing set was varied by varying the size of the negative class
instances in the ratio 1:1/2, 1:1, 1:2 and 1:5. This yielded
5,609, 11,217, 22,434 and 56,085 negative class instances
consecutively, randomly drawn from 1,210,920 unique le-
gitimate posts containing one or more URLs (see Table 2).
Figure 7 shows the results of this experiment. We were able
to achieve a maximum true positive rate of 97.7% for ma-
licious posts using the 1:1/2 split. The false positive rate
dropped to a lowest of 3.4% for 1:5 split. As we increased
the size of the negative class, both the true positive and false
positive rates for the malicious class constantly decreased.
The 1:1 split yielded the lowest average false positive rate
across both classes.
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Figure 7: (a) Accuracy values of the Random Forest classi-
fier for 1 through 42 features. Accuracy peaked to 86.9% at
top 10 features. (b) True positive and false positive rates of
malicious and legitimate classes with different sizes of the
training set.
To check the effectiveness of our model over time, we
collected test data about the Ebola outbreak in Africa dur-
ing August - October 2014. We collected a total of 59,179
posts containing URLs, out of which, 3,248 post were found
to be malicious. 12 Our final test set consisted of 6,496
posts (3,248 malicious and 3,248 randomly picked legit-
imate posts). Evaluating our balanced model (trained on
11,217 malicious and 11,217 legitimate posts) on this test
set revealed a significant drop in true positive rate, from
93.2% to 81.6%. This value is, however, a slight improve-
ment over previously reported true positive rates for spam
detection techniques over time (Gao et al. 2012).
Comparison with past work
One of the few studies on detecting malicious content on
Facebook using a dataset bigger than ours, was conducted
by Gao et al., where researchers used a clustering approach
to identify spam campaigns (Gao et al. 2010). Although au-
thors reported a high true positive rate of 93.9%, there was
no estimation of the amount of malicious posts that this ap-
proach missed (false negatives). To this end, we applied the
same clustering technique and threshold values used by Gao
et al. on our dataset to get an estimate of the false negatives
of their clustering approach. Since our entire dataset was al-
ready labeled (as opposed to Gao et al.’s dataset), we did
not apply clustering on our entire dataset to find malicious
posts. Instead, we applied clustering only on malicious posts
in our dataset, and compared how many of those clusters
met the distributed and bursty threshold values previously
used (>5 users per cluster, and <90 minutes median time
between consecutive posts respectively). Applying cluster-
ing on our 11,217 malicious posts yielded a total of 4,306
clusters. Out of these, only 183 clusters (containing 4,294
posts) met the distributed and bursty thresholds, yielding a
high false negative rate of 61.7%. These results indicate that
our machine learning models perform considerably better,
and are able to detect more than double the amount of ma-
licious posts as compared to existing clustering techniques.
We were unable to compare our results with other previous
work due to two major reasons; a) absence of features like
12We used the same methodology to find malicious posts as we
did for the 17 events in our training data.
likes, comments, message similarity etc. at zero-hour (used
by Rahman et al.), and b) public unavailability of features
like number of friends, message sent, friend choice, active
friends, page likes etc. (used by Stringhini et al. (Stringh-
ini, Kruegel, and Vigna 2010) and Ahmed et al. (Ahmed and
Abulaish 2012)).
REST API and browser plug-in
To provide a real world solution for the problem of de-
tecting malicious content on Facebook, we built a REST
based API (Application Programming Interface) using the
Random Forest classifier trained our labeled dataset. The
API is publicly accessible at http://multiosn.iiitd.edu.in/fbapi/
endpoint/?fid=〈Facebook post ID〉 and can be queried by send-
ing a HTTP GET request along with a Facebook post ID.
Due to Facebook’s API limitations, our API currently works
only for public posts which are accessible through Face-
book’s Graph API. Our API fetches the post and entity pro-
file information using Facebook’s Graph API and generates
a feature vector, which is subjected to a pre-trained classi-
fier. The label returned by the classifier is output by the API
in JSON format along with the original Facebook post ID.
For better utility of our REST API, we built a plug-in for
Google Chrome browser. Figure 8 shows the flow diagram
representing the communication flow between the browser
plug-in, REST API, and the classifier. Once installed and
enabled, this plug-in loads whenever a user opens her Face-
book page on her Google Chrome browser, and extracts the
post IDs of all public posts in the user’s newsfeed. The post
IDs are then sent to the REST based API. If the API returns
the label malicious for a post, the plug-in marks the post
with an “alert” symbol (Figure 9).
Figure 8: Flow diagram for our browser plug-in.
Limitations
We could not find a way to claim that our dataset is repre-
sentative of the entire Facebook population. Facebook does
not provide any information about what percentage of public
posts is returned by Graph API search. However, to the best
of our knowledge, our dataset of 4.4 million public posts and
3.3 million users is the biggest dataset in literature, collected
using Facebook APIs.
We understand that the WOT ratings that we used to
create our labeled dataset of malicious posts are obtained
through crowd sourcing, and may suffer biases. However,
WOT states that in order to keep ratings more reliable, the
system tracks each user’s rating behavior before deciding
how much it trusts the user. In addition, the meritocratic na-
ture of WOT makes it far more difficult for spammers to
abuse, because bots will have a hard time simulating human
Figure 9: Screenshot of a malicious Facebook post labeled
by our browser plug-in.
behavior over a long period of time. With these measures
taken by WOT to control bias, we believe that it is safe to
assume the validity of our labeled dataset of malicious posts
and hence, our results.
Conclusion
OSNs witness large volumes of content during real world
events, providing malicious entities a lucrative environment
to spread scams, and other types of malicious content. We
studied content generated during 17 such events on Face-
book, and found substantial presence of malicious content
which evaded Facebook’s existing immune system and made
it to the social graph. We observed characteristic differences
between malicious and legitimate posts and used them to
train machine learning models for automatic detection of
malicious posts. Our extensive feature set was completely
derived from public information available at zero-hour, and
was able to detect more than double the number of mali-
cious posts as compared to existing spam campaign detec-
tion techniques. Finally, we deployed a real world solution
in the form of a REST based API and a browser plug-in to
identify malicious Facebook posts in real time. In future,
we would like to test the performance and usability of our
browser plug-in. We would also like to investigate Facebook
pages spreading malicious content in further detail. Further,
we intend to study malicious Facebook posts which do not
contain URLs.
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